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Since the passage of major pollution control statutes in the early 
1970s, including such iconic regulatory programs as the Clean Air Act 
(“CAA”)1 and the Clean Water Act (“CWA”),2 we have learned quite a 
lot about environmental problems and how they may be addressed in 
 
* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.  I wish to thank the participants in the 
conference for their helpful comments when this paper was presented.  Special thanks to Professor 
Kalyani Robbins and the School of Law for making the conference such a rewarding and 
stimulating experience.  I also would like to thank my colleague, Sam Jordan, for helpful 
suggestions and conversation.  Dan Sheffner provided valuable research assistance.   
 1.  42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1990). 
 2.  33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1991). 
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effective and efficient ways.  Of course, there is still much that we do 
not know, and much of what we think we know about environmental 
problems is mostly contingent and provisional: the things that seem clear 
to us now may be decidedly less clear in the future.  Indeed, the 
provisional quality of our knowledge is one of the defining 
characteristics of our relationship to natural systems and environmental 
law: both are full of surprises and unexpected and unintended 
consequences.3 
One thing that does seem clear, however, is that the iconic statutes 
of the 1970s are built on premises that no longer obtain.  This is not to 
suggest that these statutory programs have not adapted to the changing 
character of environmental problems, nor that these programs have not 
performed tolerably well over the last forty years.  A case can be made, 
despite their outmoded foundations, that our 1970s-vintage regulatory 
programs have been remarkably successful in addressing complex, 
difficult environmental problems.4  But we can, and should, do better. 
To nudge environmental law in the direction of smarter and more 
effective problem-solving, it would be wise to take a hard look at 
existing policies and regulatory tools.  There is much good work that has 
been done on that front.  Creative, innovative thinking and 
implementation have shown that careful use of market mechanisms, 
information sharing, and more traditional standard-setting tools can be 
used effectively to address environmental issues.  Whether and under 
what circumstances these tools can effectively be deployed involve 
questions that have been, and continue to be, much debated.  
Contributions to the debate have been important and significant.  At the 
same time, a singular focus on policy instruments and regulatory tools 
 
 3.  See generally DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1990).  For views of environmental law that emphasize the complexity, 
uncertainty, and unintended consequences of natural systems, see Craig Anthony Arnold, Fourth-
Generation Environmental Law: Integrationist and Multimodal, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 771 (2011); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, 
Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 189 (2002); J. B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental 
Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean Up the Environment By Making a Mess of 
Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933 (1997); Mary Jane Angelo, Harnessing the Power of 
Science in Environmental Law: Why We Should, Why We Don’t, and How We Can, 86 TEX. L. REV. 
1527 (2008); A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling 
of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121 (1994); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Law and the 
New Ecology: Evolution, Categories, and Consequences, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 325 (1995). 
 4.  For some indicators of the success of the CWA and CAA, see U.S. EPA, OFFICE OF AIR 
AND RADIATION, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT FROM 1990 TO 2020, 
SUMMARY REPORT (Mar. 2011), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/air/sect812/feb11/summaryreport.pdf; William L. Andreen, Water Quality 
Today – Has the Clean Water Act Been a Success?, 55 ALA. L. REV. 537 (2004). 
2
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fails to address more fundamental issues.  It is also important to 
critically examine the institutional arrangements that the regulatory 
programs have created and fostered.  As Professors Freeman and Farber 
have argued, “although it is important to choose the right regulatory 
tools, it is equally crucial to design the optimal institutional 
arrangements for deploying them.”5  And here, too, there has been much 
innovative thinking and corresponding debate. 
The focus of this article is on the latter, institutional side of 
environmental regulation and management.  In what follows, I hope to 
stimulate serious discussion directed at re-imagining what effective 
institutions for environmental protection and management might look 
like.  I have chosen to use the term “regional governance” as an 
organizing theme.  At its core, a regional approach re-imagines how 
national and local interests interact, unfettered by notions of dual 
sovereignty and federalism that continue to plague our thinking about 
environmental governance.  The regional approach I advocate here 
refuses to privilege the states as presumptively appropriate partners with 
the national government in managing the complex environmental 
problems we must address.  Instead, environmental management should 
be viewed more as a means of giving voice, rather than authority, to 
shifting aggregations of sub-national interests and institutions. 
This article will proceed in three parts.  Part I provides a brief 
introduction to the structured institutional arrangements under the CAA 
and the CWA.  I discuss how these programs have evolved in ways that 
depart from what may have been originally anticipated and how their 
structure poses impediments to effective environmental management.  
Part II provides a short summary of current thinking about the 
institutional architecture of our environmental programs, focusing 
primarily on the “environmental federalism” scholarship of recent years.  
I offer reasons for abandoning federalism as an appropriate institutional 
framework.  Part III presents a conceptual, rather than tightly 
engineered, argument for regional governance institutions, which I call 
Regional Environmental Management Agencies (“REMAs”).  I 
speculate about the benefits of such institutions and provide a rough 
architectural rendering of how such institutions might be structured and 
the powers they may exercise.  The argument is provisional.  I make no 
claim to have comprehensively identified the issues that may arise in 
restructuring institutions along regional lines, nor do I claim to have 
 
 5.  Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 
795, 823 (2005). 
3
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fully grasped the range of costs, benefits, and difficulties that might 
result. 
I. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM, INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, AND PROBLEMS 
OF OVER-CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION: THE CLEAN AIR 
ACT AND CLEAN WATER ACT 
The institutional arrangements under both the CAA and the CWA 
are experiments in cooperative federalism, creating partnerships between 
the states and the national government.6  Although the respective 
programs differ in significant respects, both involve a sharing 
arrangement in which regulatory authority is divided between EPA and 
the states.  These arrangements reflect both practical considerations and 
constitutional limits placed on Congress’s authority to mandate state 
participation in federal regulatory programs.7  They are also deeply 
steeped in a loose commitment to “dual sovereignty” or “dual 
federalism,” in which program responsibilities are conceived in terms of 
distinct, yet integrated spheres of authority as between the national 
government and the states.8  State roles are typically based on accepted, 
 
 6.  See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Gorsuch, 742 F.2d 1028, 1036-37 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(describing the CAA as a “partnership between the states and the federal government” and as “an 
experiment in federalism”); Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992) (“The Clean Water Act 
anticipates a partnership between the States and the Federal Government, animated by a shared 
objective: ‘to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s 
waters.’”) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)); see Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: 
Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1147, 1174-76 (1995) (describing 
cooperative federalism model in environmental law).   
 7.  For discussion, see Erin Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability Rules in Tenth Amendment Infrastructure, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2010); 
Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. 
REV. 663 (2001).  
 8.  Robert Schapiro describes “dual federalism” as “the concept that the state and national 
governments enjoy exclusive and non-overlapping spheres of authority.”  Robert A. Schapiro, 
Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 246 (2005).  As Professor 
Schapiro notes, however, dual federalism no longer provides an accurate portrait of how power is 
allocated in our nation.  Id.  Instead, as Professor Greve argues, “American federalism has become 
an administrative, ‘cooperative federalism’: state and local governments administer and implement 
federal programs.”  Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS. L.J. 557, 558 
(2000). Nonetheless:  
the conceptual framework remains pervasive in theory and doctrine.  Dual federalism 
defined the core issue of federalism as the separation of state and national power.  The 
rigid boundary that dual federalism sought to erect has disappeared, but the basic 
conception of federalism continues to be a system of independent national and state 
governments that must be protected from each other.  Federalism remains an exercise in 
line-drawing. . . .  Dualist conceptions survive, even after dual federalism has withered 
away. 
Schapiro,supra note 8, at 246.  The structure of our major environmental programs, such as the 
4
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but ill-defined notions of functions deemed by tradition to “belong” to 
state and local governments, such as land use controls.9  State 
participation in these programs is not, in theory, compelled by federal 
law; the states may choose to assume some responsibility for program 
administration or may leave that responsibility to EPA or other 
responsible federal agencies.10  Accordingly, despite widespread State 
participation in the implementation of the CAA and CWA, these 
programs are of a distinctly national character.11 
An important feature of both the CAA and CWA is that, in general, 
the federal standards promulgated under these programs are both 
national in scope and do not preempt state regulatory efforts entirely.  At 
the national level, the CAA and CWA generally establish minimum 
standards, or “regulatory floors.”12  The states may choose to adopt more 
stringent standards,13 but there are important exceptions.14  A number of 
states have adopted more stringent regulatory standards,15 but a few have 
 
CAA and CWA, reflect this “dualist conception,” and it is these vestigial remnants of dual 
federalism in our environmental programs that I argue need critical re-examination and reform.   
 9.  For example, the Clean Water Act provides that “[i]t is the policy of the Congress to 
recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of  States to prevent, reduce, 
and eliminate pollution, [and] to plan the development and use . . . of land and water resources.”  33 
U.S.C. §1251(b) (2006).  Similarly, the Clean Air Act provides: “that air pollution prevention . . . 
and air pollution control at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local 
governments . . . .”  42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) (2006).   
 10.  42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1990). 
 11.  The programs also contemplate shared enforcement responsibilities between state and 
federal authorities, supplemented by provisions for citizen enforcement.  See Clean Air Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(C), 7413, 7604 (2006); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1342(b)(7), 1365 
(1990). 
 12.  On “regulatory floors,” see William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, 
Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547 (2007). 
 13.  For the CAA, see, for example, Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 264-65 (1976) 
(states may adopt more protective air quality regulations so long as federal “minimum conditions” 
are met).  On the CWA, see Pud No. 1 v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 705 (1994) (CWA 
“allows States to impose more stringent water quality controls”).  The CAA and CWA include 
broad non-preemption provisions.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (1977); 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1972). 
 14.  The most important exception relates to regulation of motor vehicles.  For a discussion of 
the CAA’s intricate regulatory program for motor vehicles, see Patrick Schlesinger & Michael J. 
Horowitz, Regulation of Mobile Sources: Motor Vehicles and Nonroad Engines, in CLEAN AIR ACT 
HANDBOOK 279-80 (Robert J. Martineau, Jr. & David P. Novello eds., 1998); ROBERT V. PERCIVAL 
ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 517-51 (6th ed. 2009); Ann E. 
Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1108-27 (2009).   
 15.  The most prominent example is California’s efforts to impose more stringent emissions 
limitations on motor vehicles than are required by federal standards.  See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, 
Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 171-72 
(2006).  For general discussion of how states may produce more stringent environmental regulation, 
see DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL 
ECONOMY (1995); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice 
5
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placed “regulatory ceilings” on state implementing agencies, precluding 
those agencies from adopting standards that are more stringent than the 
federal floors.16  The non-preemption commitments in the CAA and 
CWA may provide space for a dynamic regulatory regime in which 
innovative techniques and policies can flow from the bottom up, rather 
than from the top down.17  On the other hand, national standards may 
promote complacence; many states may adopt a singular focus on 
meeting national mandates, precluding critical evaluation of what may 
be best suited to address specific, and more local, environmental needs. 
The experiences under the CAA and CWA, respectively, 
demonstrate that the division of regulatory labor as between the federal 
government and the states is neither static nor entirely predictable.  As I 
will illustrate below, the experience under the CAA has been 
paradoxical.  On the one hand, there has been a gradual, but ultimately 
dramatic, decline in the role states generally play in protecting local air 
resources.  On the other hand, the states have played, and continue to 
play, a primary role in controlling interstate air pollution.  Experience 
under the CWA has followed a similar, but distinct evolutionary path.  
States now play a rather marginalized role in determining how pollution 
from existing, local point sources should be controlled, but play a 
dominant role in ensuring that water quality is protected, even in 
interstate waters and in cases involving discharges from federally 
permitted projects.  The latter roles of the states have now become 
central to the overall success of the CWA’s regulatory program, 
representing a fairly dramatic shift from the underlying premises of the 
program.  The large scale shifts in the respective responsibilities of the 
national and state governments under both the CWA and CAA support a 
careful reevaluation of the programs’ institutional arrangements. 
 
Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 585-614 (2001).  
 16.  See, e,g., Iowa Code § 459.311 (West 2013) (prohibiting Iowa Department of Natural 
Resources from adopting rules governing concentrated animal feeding operations that are more 
stringent than federal requirements).  See generally Jerome M. Organ, Limitations on State Agency 
Authority to Adopt Environmental Standards More Stringent Than Federal Standards: Policy 
Considerations and Interpretive Problems, 54 MD. L. REV. 1373, 1387-90 (1995).  
 17.  See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental Federalism, and Institutional 
Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 41 (1997) (describing how states, as 
“first innovators in efforts to rehabilitate Brownfield sites,” influenced the shape of federal 
Brownfields policies).  For a general discussion of how states may contribute to the shape of 
national policy, see Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 19 IOWA L. 
REV. 243, 288 (2005) (“The different governments can learn from each other.  They can sharpen 
their understanding of how best to define and to implement important governmental safeguards.”). 
6
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A. The Clean Air Act and the Paradox of State Authority 
The Clean Air Act’s program of cooperative federalism is complex, 
but its core lies in the relation between Sections 10918 and 110,19 which 
provide for state implementation plans (“SIPs”) to secure compliance 
with federally-promulgated national ambient air quality standards 
(“NAAQS”).  The NAAQS govern “criteria” pollutants, which currently 
include ozone, particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, 
nitrogen dioxide, and lead.20  The CAA directs EPA to promulgate 
NAAQS that are “requisite to protect the public health” and “public 
welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with 
the presence of such air pollutant[s] in the ambient air.”21  The resulting 
standards are, in theory, national in scope and uniform.22  In practice, 
however, this uniformity is tempered by two factors: (1) the applicable 
“attainment date” to which an area is subject; and (2) an anti-degradation 
program, known as the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (“PSD”) 
program, that requires areas to maintain air  quality that exceeds that 
required by the NAAQS.23  The NAAQS must be reviewed by EPA, and 
revised if necessary, no less than every five years.24 
As originally conceived, the role of the states in the NAAQS 
program was to select which existing sources of pollutants to regulate 
and how to regulate them.25  Indeed, the CAA provides “that air 
pollution prevention . . . and air pollution control at its source is the 
primary responsibility of States and local governments.”26  That 
commitment is, however, hedged; “new sources” are subject to 
 
 18.  42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1977).  
 19.  42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1990).  
 20.  For information on the NAAQS, see generally Technology Transfer Network: National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/ (last visited 
May 3, 2013). 
 21.  42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1)-(2) (1977); see also Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assns., 531 U.S. 
457 (2001).  
 22.  For criticism of the mandate for nationally uniform standards, see James Krier, On the 
Topology of Uniform Environmental Standards in a Federal System – And Why it Matters, 54 MD. 
L. REV. 1226 (1995).   
 23.  See Douglas R. Williams, Cooperative Federalism and the Clean Air Act: A Defense of 
Minimum Federal Standards, 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 67, 76 (2001) [hereinafter Williams, 
Cooperative Federalism]. 
 24.  42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(1) (1977).  
 25.  See, e.g., Union Electric Co. v. E.P.A, 427 U.S. 246, 256 (1976) (recognizing that 
through SIP process, the CAA “place[s] the primary responsibility for formulating pollution control 
strategies on the States”); Train v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975) (“[T]he 
State is at liberty to adopt whatever mix of emissions limitations it seems best suited to its particular 
situation.”).   
 26.  42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) (1990).  
7
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categorical, technology-based emissions standards promulgated by 
EPA27 or, in some cases, more individualized technological limitations 
based on federal standards.28  The states’ selected control measures are 
set forth in SIPs for each of the NAAQS and the states must demonstrate 
to EPA that their choices will limit emissions sufficiently to attain the 
NAAQS within the time frames set forth in the statute.29  Permitting the 
states to develop the SIPs, it was thought, might mitigate at least some of 
the more undesirable centralizing aspects of nationally uniform 
standards, while still providing a floor of public health and welfare 
protection.30 
EPA is authorized to approve a state’s SIP or to disapprove it in 
part or as a whole.31  An approved SIP becomes enforceable by the 
State, by EPA, or in some circumstances by citizens.32  In the event that 
a state fails to submit a required SIP or fails to correct deficiencies in a 
disapproved SIP, EPA is obligated to promulgate and implement a 
federal implementation plan, or FIP.33  Thus, states that choose to opt 
out of the CAA’s program of shared responsibilities will be subject to 
preemptive federal regulation, as well as possible loss of federal 
funding.34  The development and approval process also applies to 
revisions to an existing SIP.35 
 
 27.  42 U.S.C. §7411 (1990).   
 28.  See 42 U.S.C. 7475(a)(4) (2006) (new “major emitting facilities” in clean air areas must 
meet “best available control technology” limitations); 7503(a)(3) (new or modified stationary 
sources in nonattainment areas must comply with “the lowest achievable emission rate”).  
 29.  See 42 U.S.C. §7407(a) (1990) (describing state responsibilities).  
 30.  For example, in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 493 (2001), 
Justice Breyer suggested that the SIP process may mitigate the statutorily-required “cost-blind” 
approach to establishing NAAQS.  (Breyer, J., concurring) (“States may consider economic costs 
when they select the particular control devices used to meet the standards, and industries 
experiencing difficulty in reducing their emissions can seek an exemption or waiver from the state 
implementation plan.”).  The actual costs of program implementation may also be affected by the 
amount of “slippage” in achieving compliance with the NAAQS which is permitted or tolerated by 
the implementing agencies.  See Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and 
Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 315-16 (1999) (noting 
that “standards may merely be the government’s opening demand in negotiations, and the final 
bargain is likely to be more favorable to the other side”); Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of 
Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 57 (2001) (slippage between mandated 
standards and enforcement may “represent ‘bottom up’ efforts to improve the rationality of the 
command statutory system in light of practical experience with its implementation”).   
 31.  42 U.S.C. § 7410(k) (1990).  
 32.  42 U.S.C. § 7410. 
 33.  42 U.S.C. § 7410(c).  
 34.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7509 (1990).  
 35.  See William F. Pedersen, Why the Clean Air Act Works Badly, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1059, 
1078-79 (1981) (describing the “double key” of state and federal procedural requirements governing 
SIP revisions).  EPA regulations governing SIP requirements now run to 1700 pages.  See 40 C.F.R. 
8
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The CAA’s sharing arrangement between EPA and the states has 
proven to be a massively complex undertaking.36  The delays in, and 
costs of, developing conforming SIPs and moving them through the 
federal approval process are extraordinarily high.37  Moreover, the 
technical basis for determining whether the control measures selected by 
a state will lead to attainment of a NAAQS is subject to considerable 
uncertainties.38  Limits on modeling techniques and uncertainties in 
predictions of future emissions growth, for example, often yield SIPs 
that have a shot-in-the-dark quality about them. 
The complexity increases when one drills deeper down into the 
actual SIP development process.  In some sense, the notion of a “state” 
implementation mischaracterizes the planning process in a significant 
number of instances.  SIPs are not typically state-wide plans, though 
some components may have state-wide application.39  Instead, SIPs are 
designed to attain the NAAQS in specific “air quality control regions” 
(“AQCR”),40 which may include several local jurisdictions.  In some 
cases, particularly those involving large metropolitan areas—AQCRs 
may straddle across state jurisdictional boundaries.41  As a consequence, 
air quality planning and SIP development under the CAA is often inter-
jurisdictional, both within the respective states (involving several local 
jurisdictions) and among states, with attendant coordination problems.42 
The procedural and substantive complications that have historically 
characterized the SIP process provided space for EPA to approve, 
 
§§ 51 & 52. 
 36.  See generally Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Air Quality Protection Using State Implementation 
Plans – Thirty-Seven Years of Increasing Complexity, 15 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 209 (2004); John P. 
Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183, 1193-94 (1995) 
(discussing complexity of SIPs).   
 37.  See generally Pedersen, supra note 35, at 1072-93(describing complexities and high 
transaction costs of SIPs).  For an extreme example of the delays that can attend the SIP 
development and approval process, see Texas v. E.P.A., 690 F.3d 670, 676 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(describing more than sixteen year process involving a revision to the state of Texas’s SIP). 
 38.  See Dave Owen, Probabilities, Planning Failures, and Environmental Law, 84 TUL. L. 
REV. 265, 280-87 (2009) (discussing uncertainties concerning adequacy of SIPs). 
 39.  For an example of a SIP with both local and state-wide elements, see the Illinois State 
Implementation Plan, at Region 5, Air and Radiation, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/r5/r5ard.nsf/SIPs%20View%20By 
%20State%20Main%20View!OpenView&Start=1&Count=30&Expand=1#1 (last visited May 3, 
2013).   
 40.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (1990) (“Each State shall . . . adopt . . . a plan which provides for 
implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of [the NAAQS] in each air quality control region 
(or portion thereof) within such State.”). 
 41.  See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Federalism and the Inspection and Maintenance Program 
Under the Clean Air Act, 27 PAC. L. J. 1461, 1466 (1966) (describing SIPs and ACQRs).   
 42.  See id. at 1468.   
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without fear of judicial reversal, SIPs that had little prospect of attaining 
the NAAQS.43  The EPA had powerful incentives to approve even 
highly dubious SIPs.  Disapproval not only imposes more costs on 
states, souring the prospects of ongoing cooperative relations, it also 
imposes very high costs on EPA.  The mandate to develop and 
implement FIPs when states are unwilling to develop and implement 
conforming SIPs diverts EPA resources from other tasks that the agency 
will often regard as far more important.  Moreover, it is doubtful that 
EPA could effectively implement a FIP without significant support from 
relevant state actors.44  These practical realities have served further to 
mitigate the centralizing aspects of the CAA’s reliance on nationally 
uniform air quality standards.45 
In fact, during the early years of the CAA’s implementation, the 
complexities of the SIP development and approval process, the absence 
of nationally-mandated control measures, and EPA’s limited resources 
combined to provide the states with considerable leverage over the shape 
of the regulatory program.46  The result may be described as a form of 
negotiated federalism, in which state and national roles were somewhat 
fluid and dynamic.47  Thus, under the original framework of the CAA, 
the states were given, and enjoyed in practice, a fairly wide measure of 
discretion in choosing which sources to regulate and how stringently to 
regulate them. 
This discretion remains significant, but has become severely 
constrained as the CAA has evolved over time.  The widespread 
inadequacy of SIPs left millions of American exposed to unhealthy 
levels of air pollution.48  In 1977, Congress responded by imposing more 
detailed requirements for SIPs, including permitting programs for new 
 
 43.  See Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives, and the New Clean Air 
Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 1647, 1688-95 (describing failures of the SIP process).   
 44.  See Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 BOSTON C. L. REV. 1, 79-80 (2011) 
(“participants understand that the programs of cooperative federalism on which the big federal 
environmental statutes depend would implode without the good faith participation of state 
environmental agencies”) [hereinafter Ryan, Negotiating Federalism]; Dwyer, supra note 36, at 
1216-19.  
 45.  See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE 
L.J. 1256, 1276-77 (2009) (noting that states can play the “trump card” of lax SIPs because they are 
“indispensable”).  
 46.  Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 44, at 78-79. 
 47.  See id. at 79-80 (discussing how federal leverage is offset to some extent by “state 
capacity,” often leading to negotiated arrangements under which “EPA is more likely to support 
failing state programs with additional funding and technical assistance than it is to assume control”).  
 48.  Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons from the Clean Air 
Act, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203 (1999). 
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sources in both nonattainment and “clean air” areas.49  Nonetheless, the 
nonattainment problem persisted, and when Congress amended the CAA 
in 1990, it radically restricted state choices and significantly cabined 
EPA’s discretion.50 The 1990 amendments demand SIP revisions and 
specify in extraordinary detail what kinds of control measures states 
must select and implement.51  Of course, the dramatic increase in 
federally-prescribed SIP components limits the range of choices 
available to affected states.  In addition, Congress severely restricted 
EPA’s ability to extend the timeframes within which attainment was to 
be achieved by the states.52  These restrictions on SIP program elements 
and attainment date extensions severely limited the ability of states to 
negotiate with EPA about the timing and extent of control measures.53  
Moreover, the 1990 amendments greatly expanded the scope of 
federally-prescribed source controls, including emissions limitations for 
hazardous air pollutants54 and controls for pollutants that contribute to 
acid deposition.55  In addition, these sources must now secure operating 
permits issued under programs administered by the respective states.56 
Overall, and over time, the CAA’s regulatory program has 
progressively narrowed the range of discretion states have in fashioning 
their own strategies to respond to air quality problems.57  Congress’s 
understandable impatience with the lack of demonstrable progress in 
securing more widespread attainment of the NAAQS has led to the 
displacement of a program under which EPA and the states enjoyed 
considerable discretion in favor of a much more prescriptive program 
under which the states’ obligations have become much more ministerial 
in nature.58  As Professor Reitze has concluded, the SIP process—long 
 
 49.  The revised SIP requirements were codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479 (clean air areas) 
and §§7501-7505 (2006) (nonattainment areas).  For a discussion of the 1977 permitting 
requirements, see Pedersen, supra note 35, at 1088-93.   
 50.  See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 481- 86 (2001). 
 51.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7511a (1990). 
 52.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7511 (1990); see Sierra Club v. EPA, 311 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 53.  Sierra Club, 311 F.3d at 865. 
 54.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1999). 
 55.  42 U.S.C §§ 7651-7651o (1990).   
 56.  The permitting program is established in Title V of the 1990 amendments.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§§7661-7661f (2006).  EPA regulations governing state operating permit programs are codified at 
40 C.F.R. §§ 70.1 -.12.   
 57.  See Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse 
Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 747 n.158, (2006) 
(“Congress over time significantly scaled back the scope of state freedom to determine the 
appropriate mix of emission controls necessary to meet federal specified environmental 
objectives.”).   
 58.  Reitze, Air Quality Protection, supra note 36, at 365. 
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thought to be the primary repository of substantial state prerogatives 
under the CAA—has become largely “irrelevant” and “may have 
outlived its usefulness.”59 
The underlying premises of how state and federal relations under 
the CAA are structured have now been seriously eroded.  The 
consequences are that much of the flexible tailoring for locally diverse 
conditions that was contemplated under the original amendments is now 
open to serious question.  There is also very little room for adaptation 
and learning in light of actual experience.  And, most importantly, the 
objectives of the CAA have been compromised by the institutional 
barriers to effective implementation. 
Paradoxically, however, there is one area where state interests have 
traditionally been, and continue to be, protected under the CAA—
control of interstate transport of air pollutants.  It is paradoxical because 
it is universally recognized that when it comes to interstate pollution 
problems, federal interests should control over state interests.60  The 
problem of interstate air pollution has assumed critical importance under 
the CAA; it has become apparent that, in the absence of effective limits 
on interstate transport of pollutants, many major metropolitan areas 
simply cannot attain the NAAQS, particularly for ozone and particulate 
matter, without adopting draconian local controls.  Indeed, in some 
areas, transported pollution is so significant that even the most 
aggressive local control strategies will be insufficient to attain the 
NAAQS. 
The 1977 amendments included “good neighbor” provisions for 
addressing interstate air pollution,61 obligating all states to include 
source controls in their SIPs to ensure that in-state emissions would not 
“prevent attainment or maintenance” of the NAAQS by any other 
State.62  States affected by another state’s failure to abide by this 
obligation could petition EPA to enforce it.63  But the 1977 good 
neighbor provisions were notoriously weak.  EPA repeatedly refused to 
act on complaints from the states about the downwind effects from out-
 
 59.  Id.   
 60.  See infra note 61 and accompanying text.   
 61.  See Kay M. Crider, Interstate Air Pollution: Over a Decade of Ineffective Regulation, 64 
CH-KENT L. REV. 619, 624 (1988); see also Thomas W.  Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary 
Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 959 (1997) (noting that “no state has secured relief under [the CAA] 
for pollution emanating in another state”). 
 62.  Crider, supra note 61, at 624. 
 63.  For a discussion of the pre-1990 CAA provisions governing interstate air pollution and 
their implementation by EPA, see id. at 624-38. 
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of-state, upwind pollution sources.64 
Congress moved to strengthen the good neighbor provisions and 
EPA’s ability to address interstate transport of air pollution in the 1990 
amendments to the CAA.  Among other things, States must now include 
in their SIPs “adequate provisions . . . prohibiting . . . any source or other 
type of emissions activity within the State from emitting any air 
pollutants in amounts that will . . . contribute significantly to 
nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, any other State with 
respect to any [NAAQS].”65  In response, EPA embarked on a massive 
effort to address interstate pollution on a regional basis.66  The first step 
in this effort was the so-called NOx SIP Call, which imposed mandates 
on twenty-two states and the District of Columbia to revise their 
respective SIPs to mitigate the interstate transport of ozone.67  In an 
innovative interpretation of the 1990 CAA’s interstate air pollution 
provisions, EPA measured a state’s “significant contribution” to 
downwind nonattainment problems in part by reference to reductions 
achievable through the use of “highly cost-effective controls.”68  The 
agency also designed a regional emissions trading program into which 
the affected states could opt as a means of satisfying their good neighbor 
obligations.69  The D.C. Circuit sustained this effort in Michigan v. 
EPA,70 though the regional emissions trading program was not 
challenged.71 
Since the NOX Sip Call, EPA’s efforts to develop a regional 
solution to interstate ozone air pollution problems have been plagued by 
the cooperative federalism structure of the CAA.  Paradoxically, while 
the overall direction of the CAA has been toward greater reliance on 
nationally-prescribed source controls, efforts to address interstate 
 
 64.  See, e.g., New York v. EPA, 852 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Air Pollution Control Dist. 
of Jefferson Cnty. v. EPA, 739 F.2d 1071 (6th Cir. 1984); Conneticut v. EPA, 696 F.2d 147 (2nd 
Cir. 1982).   
 65.  42 U.S.C. §7410(a)(2)(D) (1990).  For general discussion of the 1990 amendments 
governing interstate air pollution, see Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary 
Pollution, 46 DUKE. L.J. 931, 954-56 (1997); Richard Revesz, Federalism and Interstate 
Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341 (1996).  
 66.  Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://epa.gov/airmarkets/progsregs/cair/index.html (last visited May 5, 2013).   
 67.  NOx State Implementation Plan (SIP) Call for the Mid-Atlantic States, ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/reg3artd/specprog/NOx/sip_call.htm (last visited May 3, 2013). 
 68.  See Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  For a discussion of the NOx SIP 
Call, see Patricia Ross McCubbin, Michigan v. EPA: Interstate Ozone Pollution and EPA’s “NOx 
SIP Call”, 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 47 (2001).   
 69.  See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 663. 
 70.  213 F.3d 663.  
 71.  Id. 
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transport of air pollutants has been increasingly stymied by the courts’ 
insistence that EPA respect and preserve a primary role for the states in 
controlling stationary sources. 
The first setback came with the D.C. Circuit’s decision in North 
Carolina v. EPA.72  As many metropolitan areas continued to struggle to 
meet the NAAQS, EPA promulgated the Clean Air Interstate Rule 
(“CAIR”) to tighten up restrictions on interstate transport of ozone and 
particulate matter pollution.73  As in the NOX Sip Call, EPA relied in 
part on reductions achievable through highly cost effective control 
technologies to determine which states contribute significantly to 
downwind nonattainment of the ozone and particulate matter NAAQS.74  
Like the NOX Sip Call, EPA created a regional emissions trading system 
into which consenting states could opt.75 
This time, however, the D.C. Circuit rejected EPA’s regional 
approach to interstate air pollution control.76  EPA’s approach in the 
CAIR was to employ a region-wide emissions trading program to 
determine whether upwind states collectively contributed significantly to 
nonattainment in downwind states; in this way, EPA reasoned, the 
aggregate levels of reductions needed for downwind states to achieve the 
NAAQS could be made in the most cost-effective manner.77  The effect 
of this approach was that, at least in theory, sources in particular states 
could avoid making any reductions in their emissions, so long as they 
could secure through trading sufficient reductions from other sources 
within the region.  Through the interstate trading mechanism, the 
collective “significant contribution” of upwind sources in the region 
could be eliminated, even if an individual state’s contribution was not.78  
The court held, however, that the CAA does not permit EPA to act on a 
regional basis; instead, any effort by EPA to address the statute’s 
requirement that SIPs include measures to ensure that sources “within 
the State” do not contribute significantly to downwind nonattainment 
must “actually require elimination of emissions from [such] sources.”79  
On reconsideration, the court remanded to EPA, but declined to vacate 
 
 72.  531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008).   
 73.  Rule To Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone (Clean Air 
Interstate Rule); Revisions to Acid Rain Program; Revisions to the NO[x] SIP Call, 70 Fed. Reg. 
25,162 (May 12, 2005) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, 72, 73, 74, 77, 78, 96). 
 74.  See North Carolina, 531 F.3d at 903. 
 75.  See id. 
 76.  See id. at 907. 
 77.  See id.  
 78.  See id.   
 79.  Id. at 908.  
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the CAIR.80 
EPA attempted to respond to the remand by promulgating the 
Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, also known as the Transport Rule.81  The 
rule purported to correct the deficiencies of the CAIR by allocating 
control requirements on more state-specific criteria.82  Nonetheless, the 
methodology used by EPA could, in theory, require some states to 
reduce emissions to aggregate levels that were below the initial 
screening levels used to determine which states should be subject to the 
rule’s emission reductions program.83  That result was a consequence of 
EPA’s reliance on “cost-effective controls” for determining what levels 
of emissions “significantly contribute” to downwind state 
nonattainment.84  EPA also promulgated FIPs for the states covered by 
the Transport Rule, concluding that the covered states had failed to 
submit approvable SIPs to meet their good neighbor obligations under 
the CAA.85 
The D.C. Circuit in EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA,86 
vacated and remanded the Transport Rule.  The court concluded that the 
CAA imposes three sets of constraints on EPA’s authority to control 
interstate air pollution spillovers.87  First, the court held that only 
emissions “that travel beyond an upwind State’s borders and end up in a 
downwind State’s nonattainment area” may be restricted by EPA under 
its authority to enforce the good neighbor SIP requirements of the 
CAA.88  Second, the court held that EPA must not only consider the 
amount of pollution a particular state sends to a downwind jurisdiction, 
but how those absolute amounts of pollution compare with the amounts 
sent by other upwind states—a kind of “equitable sharing of burdens” 
principle.89  Finally, the court held that, “to conform to the text of the 
statute, EPA must also ensure that the combined obligations of the 
various upwind States, as aggregated, do not produce more than 
 
 80.  Id.   
 81.  Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone 
and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48208 (Aug. 8, 2011).   
 82.  See id. at 48, 211. 
 83.  See EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 84.  See id. at 24.  
 85.  Id.  
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. at 20. 
 89.  Id.  The court concluded that “EPA may not require any upwind State to ‘share the 
burden of reducing other upwind states’ emissions. . . .  In other words, the statutory text . . . 
contains not just an absolute component . . . but also a relative component . . . .”  (quoting North 
Carolina v. EPC, 531 F.3d 896, 921 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). 
15
Williams: Toward Regional Governance
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2013
VOL. 46, NO. 4 - ARTICLE 8 WILLIAMS (DO NOT DELETE) 9/19/2013  2:51 PM 
1062 AKRON LAW REVIEW [46:1047 
necessary ‘over-control’ in the downwind States—that is, that the 
obligations do not go beyond what is necessary for the downwind States 
to achieve the NAAQS.”90 The end result is that the CAA requires that 
“the collective burden [of regional emissions that contribute to 
downwind nonattainment] must be allocated among the upwind States in 
proportion to the size of their contributions to the downwind State’s 
nonattainment,”91 and must ensure that mandated reductions do not 
“yield more downwind air quality benefits than necessary for downwind 
areas to attain the NAAQS.”92  Finding that the Transport Rule did not 
conform to these requirements, the D.C. Circuit vacated it and remanded 
the matter to EPA.93 
In another important move, the court of appeals in EME Homer 
City held that despite the many years of inadequate commitments to 
control the export of pollution in the SIPs of upwind states, EPA may 
not impose FIPs unless and until the agency first specifies the amount of 
“significant contribution” each upwind state must eliminate, gives the 
states an opportunity to revise their SIPs to make the necessary 
reductions, and the states fail to take the necessary actions to so revise 
their respective SIPs.94  Only then may EPA impose a FIP.95  In other 
words, rather than placing the responsibility on the states in the first 
instance to determine if sources within their jurisdictions contribute 
significantly to downwind nonattainment, and to address such 
contributions in their SIPs, EPA must first demonstrate that sources 
within a state are contributing to downwind nonattainment and then 
precisely identify the extent to which that contribution is deemed to be 
significant.  On this view, everything depends on EPA’s willingness, and 
capacity, to make the first move. 
The efforts by EPA to address interstate air pollution dramatically 
illustrate the barriers that the cooperative federalism model places in the 
way of effective environmental management.  The first barrier is that 
requiring that interstate-induced nonattainment problems be treated in 
highly fine-tuned, pair-wise upwind-downwind state terms dramatically 
limits EPA’s ability to fashion efficient, cost-effective solutions to 
interstate pollution problems.  This approach stands in marked contrast 
to the other authority EPA enjoys under the CAA to impose categorical 
 
 90.  Id. at 22. 
 91.  Id. at 21.  
 92.  Id. at 22. 
 93.  Id. at 37. 
 94.  Id. at 18 
 95.  Id. at 31.  
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emissions limitations on local sources, regardless whether such limits 
may, in theory, result in more emissions reductions than are necessary to 
attain the NAAQS.  This result seems to turn federalism principles on 
their head, empowering national authority to regulate heavily in cases 
that seem to involve only local air quality problems, but tightly 
constraining national authority to address interstate air quality problems. 
The second barrier to effective environmental management in the 
existing institutional arrangements relates to the procedural complexities 
associated with addressing interstate pollution problems.  Initial SIP 
development occurs at the state level, in which affected out-of-state 
interests are not represented and have no effective voice.  In theory, 
affected downwind interests may object to inadequate protection of their 
interests when EPA conducts rulemaking to review the SIPs submitted 
by upwind states.  There is, however, a distinct set of problems 
associated with making these participation rights effective. 
First, state SIPs are primarily focused on attaining the NAAQS in 
the AQCRs within the state.  As a consequence, the air quality modeling 
used to demonstrate the SIP’s adequacy will not necessarily, and 
typically does not, consider extra-jurisdictional effects.  Indeed, the 
court’s decision in EME Homer City strongly suggests that states simply 
have no obligation to consider such effects in the SIP development 
process unless and until EPA directs the state to reduce emissions from 
specific sources (or groups of sources) by a specific amount.96  
Accordingly, any downwind state’s objection to a SIP before EPA will 
have to be supported by additional evidence demonstrating that the SIP 
does not adequately address the upwind state’s “significant contribution” 
to downwind nonattainment. 
Second, while EPA may in theory rely on evidence submitted in the 
SIP approval process to support an objection from downwind states, the 
agency will also have to quantify the reductions the state must achieve in 
order to satisfy the state’s good neighbor obligations.  This may work 
tolerably well if the interstate air quality problem is bi-lateral, involving 
only one upwind and one downwind state, respectively.  But it is 
doubtful that there are many interstate air quality problems of this type; 
indeed, the recent evidence is that interstate air quality problems are 
multi-lateral and regional in scope, involving many upwind and 
downwind states.  In these circumstances, under North Carolina and 
EME Homer City, the cleanup burdens associated with multi-state air 
quality problems must be allocated among the upwind states in an 
 
 96.  Id.  
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equitable manner.97  There will thus be the need for a separate 
rulemaking in which all affected states may participate.  In short, in the 
absence of prior “significant contribution” findings by EPA, downwind 
states have no effective mechanism for challenging a particular state’s 
proposed SIP.  The procedural complexities and costs associated with 
addressing interstate air quality problems thus make effective air quality 
management extraordinarily difficult under current institutional 
arrangements. 
B. The Clean Water Act and the Growth of State Authority 
Like the CAA, the CWA is modeled on a cooperative federalism 
basis, in which regulatory responsibilities are divided between EPA and 
the states.  The heart of the CWA is section 301(a), which prohibits 
unpermitted discharges of pollutants from point sources into “navigable 
waters.”98  The CWA establishes two permitting systems.  The National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”), established under 
Section 402, applies to all point source discharges of all pollutants,99 
except “dredged and fill material.”  Point source discharges of dredged 
and fill material are subject to a separate program established under 
Section 404.100  The NPDES is administered by EPA while the Section 
404 program is jointly administered by EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers.101 
EPA may delegate the administration of either or both of these 
permit programs to States with approved programs.102  Delegations 
under Section 402 are often referred to as State Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (“SPDES”) programs, and nearly all of the States 
have chosen to administer such programs.103  Delegations under Section 
404, by contrast, are much more limited in scope.  Section 404(g) 
 
 97.  See North Carolina v. EPA, 550 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see also EME Homer City 
Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 98.  33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1995). 
 99.  See Natural Resources Def. Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 
(holding that EPA lacks “authority to exempt categories of point sources from the permit 
requirements of § 402”). 
 100.  33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1987). 
 101.  See Douglas R. Williams & Kim Diana Connolly, Federal Wetlands Regulation: An 
Overview in WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY: UNDERSTANDING SECTION 404 8-9 (Kim Diana 
Connolly et al. eds. 2005); see also Section 404 Permitting, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/cwa/dredgdis (last visited May 3, 2013). 
 102.  See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(b), 1344(g) (2000).   
 103.  For a list of states with approved State NPDES programs, see 
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestats.cfm. 
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reserves exclusive jurisdiction for the federal government over 
discharges of dredged and fill material into what are commonly known 
as “traditional navigable waters” and wetlands adjacent to such 
waters.104  In part due to the limited scope of section 404 delegations, 
only two states, Michigan and New Jersey, administer permit programs 
approved under Section 404.105 
Permits issued under the EPA-administered NPDES program or by 
a state-administered SPDES programs must incorporate technology-
based effluent limitations.106  These limitations are promulgated by EPA 
on a categorical, industry-wide basis and are subject to revision at five-
year intervals.107  As originally conceived, the technology-based 
standards were to be implemented in stages of increasing stringency, 
culminating in a requirement that all point sources be subject to effluent 
limitations based on the “best available technology.”108  The overall goal 
of the CWA was to eliminate point source discharges completely by 
1985109 through progressively more stringent technology-forcing federal 
regulations.110 
The basic assumption of the original CWA was that strict, 
nationally-promulgated categorical limitations on all discharges from 
point sources would perform yeoman’s work to the end of restoring and 
maintaining “the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation’s waters.”111  Short of that, it was expected that the regulatory 
program for point sources would achieve an “interim goal” of 
“fishable/swimmable” water quality (i.e., “water quality which provides 
for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and 
provides for recreation in and on the water”) by 1983.112  Under these 
 
 104.  R.von Oppenfeld, State Roles in the Implementation of the Section 404 Program, in 
WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY: UNDERSTANDING SECTION 404 322-25 (Kim Diane Connolly, et al. 
eds, 2005). 
 105.  See id. at 322-25.  More information on state assumption of Section 404 permitting 
authority is available at http://water.epa.gov/type/wetlands/outreach/fact23.cfm.  For discussion of 
why few states have chosen to assume such responsibilities, see Oliver A. Houck & Michael 
Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands Regulation: A Consideration of Delegation of Clean Water Act 
Section 404 and Related Programs to the States, 54 MD. L. REV. 1242 (1995). 
 106.  See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a)(1), 1342(b)(1)(B) (2000).  For an overview of the permitting 
process and its requirements, see Office of Wastewater Management: Water Permitting 101, ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/101pape.pdf (last visited May 5, 2013).  
 107.  33 U.S.C. §1311 (1995); see E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. Inc.  v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 
115-116 (1977).  
 108.  See Andreen, supra note 4, at 548. 
 109.  33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1991). 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1991) (stating objectives of CWA). 
 112.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1991). 
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assumptions, the role of states in the overall implementation of the 
CWA, while significant, was largely limited to implementing nationally-
promulgated point source controls. 
The CWA’s confidence in the point source control program was, 
however, hedged.  The CWA does include a “safety net” to backstop any 
shortcomings that may be experienced in the implementation of 
technology-based point source controls.113  The Act requires that more 
stringent effluent limitations be fashioned if necessary to meet water 
quality standards.114  This safety net was expected to perform a limited 
and interstitial role, plugging some leaks in the (expected) shortcomings 
of the more prescriptive regulatory program.  Nonetheless, the reality 
now is that the water quality safety net drives the regulatory program.115  
Its role is neither occasional nor interstitial; it is pervasive and primary. 
Implementation of the water quality standards is almost entirely 
dependent on the states.  A brief overview explains why.  First, the 
CWA relies on the states to establish water quality standards, subject to 
EPA oversight.116  The standards may vary in stringency from one water 
segment to another and within the same segment as it flows from one 
jurisdiction into another.117  The varying stringency is a function of the 
discretion states have over two required elements of water quality 
standards: “use designations” and “water quality criteria.”118  As to uses, 
the CWA does create a presumptive regulatory floor—the 
fishable/swimmable goal.119  The floor may be lowered, however, in 
some circumstances—namely, a demonstration by the state that the 
presumptive floor cannot be attained without, among other things, 
 
 113.  See E.P.A. v. CA ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 205 n.12 (1976) 
(describing water quality standards as “a supplementary basis . . . to prevent water quality from 
falling below acceptable levels”).  See generally, PERCIVAL, supra note 14, at 714-15 (describing 
water quality standards as “a ‘safety net’ to back up the technology-based controls on which the 
[CWA] primarily relies”). 
 114.  See 33 U.S.C. §1312(a) (1987). 
 115.  See Robert L. Glicksman & Matthew R. Bezel, Science, Politics, Law, and the Arc of the 
Clean Water Act: The Role of Assumptions in the Adoption of a Pollution Control Landmark, 32 
WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 99, 135 (2010) [hereinafter Science, Politics, Law, and the Arc of the Clean 
Water Act] infra note 132 (noting that the “[t]he statutory safety net—in the form of state water 
quality standards—has . . . taken on a larger role”). 
 116.  See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(a)-(b).  The state role in establishing water quality standards is 
discussed in detail in Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution, supra note 48, 209-15.   
 117.  See Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution, supra note 48, at 213 (“[T]he 
system of ambient standards established under the CWA is characterized by considerable variation 
among the states, even those in the same geographic region with similar or identical environmental 
conditions, and even those that share a single interstate water body.”). 
 118.  See 40 C.F.R. § 131.6 (1983). 
 119.  See id. at § 1251(a)(2). 
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“substantial and widespread economic and social impact”120—a 
“feasibility-limited” approach that is noticeably absent from  the ambient 
air quality floors established by the CAA. 
The second constitutive element of water quality standards—water 
quality criteria—also vests in the states a large measure of flexibility.  
EPA does play a role here, but is limited to issuing non-binding 
guidelines and ensuring that the criteria chosen by the states are 
adequate to support designated uses.121  Uncertainties in the relationship 
between ambient concentrations of particular pollutants and impacts on 
designated uses, particularly with respect to toxic water pollutants, open 
a very large space for state discretion.122 
The CWA contemplated that state promulgated water quality 
standards would be implemented in a couple of different ways.  
Primarily, the act authorized EPA to tighten effluent limitations on point 
sources to meet the water quality standards, but this approach was not 
mandatory and EPA has ignored it.123  The procedure for imposing more 
stringent water-quality-based limitations on point sources obligated EPA 
to examine the relationship between the costs and benefits of such 
heightened restrictions, a process that is both cumbersome and would be 
difficult for EPA to defend in court.124  This approach to implementing 
water quality standards never took hold and, in fact, has been 
abandoned.125 
The states’ role in protecting water quality is underscored by the 
CWA’s alternative mechanisms implementing, or at least respecting, 
state water quality standards.  Section 401 of the CWA requires that 
applicants for federal permits or licenses (other than state-issued CWA 
 
 120.  See 40 C.F.R. 131.10(g)(6) (1983).  Allowable variances from the “fishable/swimmable” 
standard must be based on a “use attainability analysis.”  For discussion, see Missouri Coalition for 
the Env’t v. Jackson, 853 F. Supp. 2d 903, 905 (W.D. Mo. 2012).   
 121.  33 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (2000). 
 122.  See Natural Resources Def. Council v. EPA, 16 F.3d 1395, 1401 (4th Cir. 1993) 
(upholding deferential EPA review of state water quality criteria). 
 123.  See Kenneth M. Murchison, Learning From More than Five-and-a-Half Decades of 
Federal Water Pollution Control Legislation: Twenty lessons for the Future, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. 
L. REV. 527, 551-52 (2005). 
 124.  See id. (describing procedures to impose more stringent water-quality-based standards on 
point sources); Robert L. Glicksman, & Matthew R. Batzel, Science, Politics, and Law, and the Arc 
of the Clean Water Act: The Role of Assumptions in the Adoption of a Pollution Control Landmark, 
32 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 99, 119-20 (2010) (noting that “[w]ater quality standards . . . often 
cannot be translated into effluent limitations that are defendable in court tests”). 
 125.  See Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, supra note 30, at 55 
(concluding that “EPA has entirely failed to implement Section 302 of CWA, providing for point-
source effluent limitations beyond those required to meet federal technology-based requirements 
and state water quality standards, rendering it a dead letter”). 
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discharge permits) that may result in jurisdictional discharges obtain a 
certification from the appropriate state that the discharge will not, among 
other things, violate applicable water quality standards.126  The 
certifying state may impose specific measures to ensure that state water 
quality standards are not violated by the federally-permitted activity and 
these measures become a condition to be included in the federal permit 
or license.127  Absent such certification, or a state’s waiver of 
certification, federal agencies must deny the requested permit or 
license.128 
In contrast to the procedure for imposing more stringent water-
quality-based effluent limitations on point sources in CWA discharge 
permits, the water quality certification procedures for other federal 
permits and licenses have been in some cases aggressively enforced by 
the states.129  Moreover, the certification operates like a reverse 
“preemption” mechanism, in which federal permitting authorities must 
abide by state certification decisions, with no effective federal forum 
available to the agency or the permit applicant to challenge certification 
decisions deemed to be unreasonable or otherwise unlawful.130 
The role for the states in the CWA’s regulatory program is most 
evident, and most ineffective, when the forms of water pollution that 
currently present the largest threat to achieving water quality objectives 
are considered.  By now, it is widely accepted that “non-point source 
pollution has evolved into the largest single obstacle to improving water 
quality.”131  Indeed, non-point source pollution is estimated to be the 
principal culprit in over three-quarters of all lakes and rivers that fail to 
meet water quality standards.132  Although EPA has some indirect 
influence on control of non-point source pollution by virtue of the 
Section 303(d) “total maximum daily loads” program,133 it lacks any 
ability to directly regulate most forms of this water quality 
 
 126.  33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (1977).  
 127.  Id. § 1341(d).   
 128.  Id. § 1341(a). 
 129.  See, e.g., PUD No. 1 v. Wash. Dept. of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994). 
 130.  See Lake Carriers Ass’n v. E.P.A., 652 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (federal agency does 
not have authority to challenge or alter conditions imposed by certifying state; challenge to such 
conditions may be had in state court); Am. Rivers v. FERC, 129 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997).  
 131.  See Andreen, supra note 4. 
 132.  See Glicksman & Batzel, Science, Politics, Law, and the Arc of the Clean Water Act, 
supra note 115, at 132.  
 133.  See Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2002); Guidelines for Reviewing 
TMDLs Under Existing Regulations Issued in 1992, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,  
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/lawsguidance/cwa/tmdl/final52002.cfm (last visited May 5, 2013). 
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impairment.134  Non-point source pollution is principally the result of 
land use practices, such as urbanization and agricultural, silvicultural, 
and mining practices that are traditionally governed by state and local 
law.  These practices are currently beyond the reach of direct national 
regulatory authority under the CWA.  The CWA addresses non-point 
source pollution primarily through planning requirements supported by 
federal funding, but is largely limited to whatever measures the states 
may choose to adopt.135  EPA has authority to approve or disapprove 
these plans, but has no authority to promulgate a plan of its own when 
states refuse to submit a plan or submit one that fails to meet statutory 
requirements.136  Most states have not imposed enforceable controls on 
non-point source pollution, but instead have relied on voluntary 
measures and local government authority.137 
General assessments of the performance of the CWA conclude that 
the structural limitations of the CWA, particularly the absence of 
effective authority to control non-point source pollution, remain the 
greatest obstacle to achieving the legislation’s goal of “restor[ing] and 
maintain[ing] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation’s waters.”138  There is, moreover, widespread recognition that 
effective measures to improve water quality will require planning and 
assessment at the watershed, rather than water segment, level.139  The 
state-centered approach of the CWA to water quality improvements 
hampers effective watershed management by deferring to a patchwork of 
inconsistent, and often inadequate, standards and management 
techniques.140 
 
 134.  See Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution, supra note 48, at 226-30. 
 135.  See OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY, AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 30-31 (2nd ed. 2002); see also Douglas R. Williams, When Voluntary, Incentive-
Based Controls Fail: Structuring a Regulatory Response to Agricultural Non-Point Source Water 
Pollution, 9 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 21, 67-78 (discussing CWA planning requirements for non-
point source pollution) [hereinafter Williams, When Voluntary Controls Fail]. 
 136.  See Williams, When Voluntary Controls Fail, supra note 135, at 74.   
 137.  See id. at 72-73. 
 138.  See, e.g., Williams F. Pedersen, Turning the Tide on Water Quality, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
69, 94 (1988) (noting that “[n]onpoint and water quality control authorities . . . are absent from the 
Clean Water Act”); Robert Adler, Resilience, Restoration and Sustainability: Revisiting the 
Fundamental Principles of the Clean Water Act, 32 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 139, 159-162 (2010) 
(discussing the CWA’s ineffective regulation of non-point source pollution); Andreen, supra note 4, 
592-93 (discussing problem of non-point source pollution). 
 139.  See A Watershed Approach, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
www.epa.gov/type/watersheds/approach.cfm (last visited May 5, 2013); see also Robert W. Adler, 
Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 ENVTL. L. 973 (1995). 
 140.  See Adler, Addressing Barriers, supra note 140, at 991-95; see also Murchison, supra 
note 123, 594-96. 
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C. Problems of Coordination, Disruption, and Resiliency Under the 
CAA and CWA 
In addition to the problems discussed above, the cooperative 
federalism model of the CAA and CWA also suffers from more general 
problems of coordination, disruption, and lack of resiliency.  State 
responsibilities under the respective programs are often dependent on 
first moves by EPA, as the EME Homer City decision highlights.141  Yet, 
in many cases, EPA’s program responsibilities are fragmented in ways 
that make overall coordination difficult.  Consider the CAA.  In addition 
to SIP requirements, attainment or maintenance of the NAAQS may be 
significantly affected by federally-promulgated emissions limitations on 
a variety of mobile and stationary sources and, most significantly, by 
revisions to the NAAQS themselves.  In a very real sense, the SIP 
planning process may be directed at a moving target.  As a consequence, 
EPA faces serious problems in coordinating its rulemaking 
responsibilities under the CAA’s various air quality programs to ensure 
that the SIP process does not break down or become subject to excessive 
delays and high transaction costs. 
The experience of EPA’s efforts to address interstate air pollution 
highlight just how difficult and complex this coordination problem can 
be.  Downwind states that are dependent on EPA’s efforts to restrict 
emissions from upwind sources may find themselves left with 
inadequate SIPs when EPA’s efforts fail, and thus may face an 
obligation to revise their SIPs to include very costly and unpopular 
control measures that are needed to address continuing threats to public 
health and welfare.  Many states may simply balk at making such 
revisions and will likely receive a sympathetic hearing before EPA.142  
Upwind states, likewise, may be understandably reluctant to undertake 
SIP revisions for fear that EPA may promulgate rules that alter 
regulatory requirements.  The serious “moving target” quality about the 
EPA-SIP revision process at the least adds significant transactions costs 
to the regulatory program and diverts resources from more meaningful 
regulatory efforts. 
The coordination problem becomes considerably more pronounced 
when the field is enlarged to consider the program responsibilities of 
 
 141.  EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2012).  
 142.  For some examples of such sympathy by EPA, see Williams, Cooperative Federalism, 
supra note 23, at 91-95.  
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EPA that are scattered throughout the CAA.  Consider a straightforward 
example.  EPA revisions to an existing NAAQS trigger the states’ 
obligation to develop and submit revised SIPs.  During the same period, 
EPA may also be conducting or considering other rulemakings.  These 
parallel rulemakings may directly affect the requirements to which the 
SIPs must conform or indirectly affect the pollution control strategies 
from which the states may choose.  For example, EPA may promulgate 
or be in the process of promulgating rules imposing stricter emissions 
limitations on new motor vehicles, or rules requiring significant 
reductions in emissions of hazardous air pollutants—many of which are 
precursors of or contributors to ambient levels of criteria pollutants such 
as ozone or particulate matter.  The new rules may significantly alter the 
amount of emissions reductions states may have to eke out of other, 
existing sources, often at very high costs, to demonstrate that their SIP 
measures will attain the revised NAAQS.  Alternatively, the new rules 
may be the necessary, critical piece in an overall control strategy that 
can be demonstrated to push an area into attainment.  The EPA’s ability 
to manage the timing of its rulemaking responsibilities clearly may 
dramatically impact the timing and content of state SIP revisions. 
Another, often under-appreciated factor that complicates the CAA’s 
institutional structure is also highlighted by the EME Homer City 
decision.143  That factor is the disruptive effect on program development 
and implementation occasioned by the provision for judicial review.144  
Judicial reversal or remand of EPA rules can have a substantial, 
program-wide effect on existing SIPs and the need for SIP revisions.  In 
some cases, of course, a judicial remand may simply require EPA to take 
minor corrective action that can be completed within reasonably short 
periods of time.145  In other cases, however, the basis for a judicial 
remand may require the agency to rethink its entire approach to a 
particular rulemaking task or to abandon it completely.146  The affected 
states may again become obligated to revise their SIP, exposing the 
States and EPA to another round of expensive, time-consuming 
rulemakings.  In addition, many of EPA’s rulemaking responsibilities 
are non-discretionary in character and may be enforced by the courts at 
 
 143.  EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 25 (dissent).  
 144.  See Paul S. Weiland & Robert O. Vos, Reforming EPA’s Organizational Structure: 
Establishing an Adaptable Agency Through Eco-Regions, 42 NAT. RES. J. 91, 107-09 (2002) 
(discussing effect of litigation on EPA’s implementation of environmental laws). 
 145.  See Robert L. Glicksman, The Value of Agency-Forcing Citizens Suits to Enforce Non-
Discretionary Duties, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 358 (2004). 
 146.  Id.  
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the behest of interested citizens.147  These judicial mandates may divert 
EPA resources from other responsibilities, some of which may be related 
to SIP requirements or the SIP approval process.148 
Along with the disruption to overall programmatic objectives, 
judicial reversal also highlights the lack of resiliency in the cooperative 
federalism structure of our major environmental programs.  Of course, 
judicial review may disrupt program implementation regardless whether 
the program is modeled under a cooperative federalism approach or 
otherwise.  Nonetheless, the disruptive effect of judicial review under 
the cooperative federalism model may be much more pronounced, at 
least in terms of national programmatic effects, because of the 
interdependence of the working parts of the program.  Put another way, 
the cooperative federalism model lacks resiliency in the face of major 
program disruptions like judicial reversal of EPA rules. 
II. TO CENTRALIZE OR DECENTRALIZE: WHY FEDERALISM IS NOT THE 
APPROPRIATE FRAME 
From the very beginnings of the environmental movement, there 
has been considerable interest in large structural issues pertaining to the 
institutional design of regulatory programs.  This is particularly true with 
respect to issues concerning how regulatory authority for environmental 
protection should be allocated in our federal system of government.  
Indeed, the sub-field of “environmental federalism” has generated 
volumes of work and spawned numerous conferences and symposia.  In 
the legal scholarly literature, for years the issue was, and to some extent 
still is, dominated by a constrained set of structural choices.  Doubtless 
due to the constitutional status of the states and the national government, 
the choices seemed to be limited to a highly centralized national 
regulatory program or a decentralized and diverse set of programs 
administered by the states, or some admixture of the two.  In short, 
“federalism” and the ghost of dual sovereignty have had a profound and 
ubiquitous effect on our thinking about the appropriate shape of our 
environmental laws. 
Richard Stewart significantly shaped the terms of debate, 
 
 147.  Citizen initiated litigation has had dramatic effects on the shape of our environmental 
programs.  For an overview, see Glicksman, The Value of Agency, supra note 146; see also Barton 
H. Thomson, Jr., Innovations in Environmental Policy: The Continuing Innovation in Citizen 
Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185 (2000). 
 148.  On the manner in which litigation disrupts and reorients EPA’s priorities, see generally 
ROSEMARY O’LEARY, ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE EPA (1993); SKIP 
MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT (1983). 
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explaining with care why it is necessary to have some mix of federal and 
state regulatory authority to address the diverse character of 
environmental problems and politics.149  Stewart observed that our 
political traditions have presumed a principle of subsidiarity; highly 
decentralized, state-centered allocation of regulatory authority for 
environmental protection is the presumptive norm.150  Departures from 
that norm—in the form of exertions of national regulatory power—
require some measure of justification.151 
The bases for this presumption are by now familiar.  There is the 
argument from utilitarianism: decentralized decision-making is more 
likely than nationally uniform regulation to regulate in ways that reflect 
“geographical variations in preferences for collective goods like 
environmental quality.”152  Moreover, even when there is widespread 
agreement on the environmental objectives to be pursued, decentralized 
decision-making is likely to be more cost-effective because it can 
account for local environmental conditions and harness local knowledge 
in ways that centralized decision-making cannot.153  Then there is the 
argument from innovation and adaptive learning: decentralized 
regulatory structures may serve as policy laboratories, experimenting 
with varying degrees of environmental quality and ways to achieve 
them, resulting in a richly diverse national portfolio of policies and 
environments, as well as transferable technical and social knowledge.154  
 
 149.  Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State 
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977) [hereinafter Stewart, 
Pyramids of Sacrifice?].  On the significance of Professor Stewart’s contributions, see David E. 
Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating Environmental 
Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796, 1803 (2008) [hereinafter Adelman & Engel, Adaptive 
Federalism] (“Early scholarship followed a framework set forth by Richard Stewart.”).  
 150.  See Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?, supra note 149, at 1211.  On the principle of 
subsidiarity in environmental governance, see also Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in 
Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 130, 134-35 (2005). 
 151.  Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?, supra note 149, at 1211.  
 152.  Id. at 1210.  
 153.  See Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch, supra note 150, at 136-37. 
 154.  See Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?, supra note 149, at 1211.  For the classic statement 
of how the states can serve as “laboratories” for policy development, see New State Ice Co. v. 
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“[It] is one of the happy incidents of 
the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; 
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).  See also 
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (noting that federalism “allows for more innovation 
and experimentation in government”).  For a classic theoretical account casting doubt on the thesis 
that federalism promotes experimentation and innovation, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking 
and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 594 (1980).  For a 
more recent skeptical view of the thesis, see Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of 
Democracy? Policy  Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333 (2009). 
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Finally, there is the argument from democracy and community that 
decentralized structures promote greater measures of active civic 
engagement and democratic accountability.155 
Stewart also provided a menu of factors that alone or in 
combination warrant departures from the presumptive norm.156  First, 
decentralization, and the diversity of policies it fosters, may introduce a 
dynamic of competition among jurisdictions seeking to retain or attract 
mobile capital investment.157  This dynamic may bear the structure of a 
classic prisoners’ dilemma game, or a “tragedy of the commons,” in 
which the individually rational actions of each jurisdiction yield a 
collectively irrational result.158  The result is a “race-to-the-bottom,” in 
which competing states will enforce only lax environmental standards in 
an effort to attract and retain mobile capital investment.159  The logic and 
empirical verification of the “race” remain hotly contested.160 
National approaches to environmental management may also be 
warranted when they yield important economies of scale for some 
critical regulatory tasks, particularly those involving “recurring, 
technically complex, issues.”161  While diverse local conditions can 
stymie desirable environmental outcomes when excessively uniform 
regulatory measures are employed, there are nonetheless basic questions 
the answers to which are not entirely dependent on local conditions.  
Providing a more centralized authority for developing and disseminating 
transferable information and technologies can significantly reduce the 
costs of environmental regulation by eliminating duplicative, redundant 
 
 155.  See Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?, supra note 149, at 1210.  
 156.  Id. at 1211. 
 157.  Id. at 1211-12.   
 158.  Id. at 1211-12. 
 159.  The “race-to-the bottom” rationale for federal regulation finds voice in several Supreme 
Court decisions involving the scope of national power.  See, e.g.,United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 
100 (1941). 
 160.  Richard Revesz, for example, concludes that there is no theoretical basis for concluding 
that competition among jurisdictions will take on the structure of a prisoners’ dilemma game instead 
of more standard models of competition that yield an equilibrium state in which social welfare is 
maximized.  See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-
to-the Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U.L.REV.1210, 1242 
(1992) [hereinafter Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition].  For additional criticism of the 
race-to-the-the-bottom theory, see Frank B. Cross, The Folly of Federalism, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 
12-18 (2002).  Professor Engel, by contrast, has argued that the available empirical evidence, while 
not conclusive, supports the application of game theoretic models, which predict a race-to-the 
problem.  See Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a Race” and Is It 
“to-the-Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271,  351 (1997). 
 161.  See Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition, supra note 161, at 1212. 
28
Akron Law Review, Vol. 46 [2013], Iss. 4, Art. 9
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss4/9
VOL. 46, NO. 4 - ARTICLE 8 WILLIAMS (DO NOT DELETE) 9/19/2013  2:51 PM 
2013] TOWARD REGIONAL GOVERNANCE 1075 
analysis.162 
Other collective action problems, particularly the high transaction 
costs that hamper effective representation of environmental interests at 
the state and local levels, may explain local willingness to sacrifice 
environmental quality to retain or attract investment, and may also 
warrant departures from a broadly decentralized structure of regulatory 
authority.163  Like the predicted race-to-the-bottom, the theory that 
decentralized policy-making is more likely than centralized policy-
making to be distorted by collective action problems is more a point for 
argument than proven insight. 
Stewart also suggested that national regulation may be preferable to 
more decentralized regulatory options because it may be more conducive 
to securing popular commitment to positive environmental change in the 
face of significant costs.164  Stewart posited that “[n]ational mechanisms 
for determining environmental policies facilitate, to a greater degree than 
their state and local counterparts, the achievement of commitments 
entailing material sacrifice. . . .  Communities no less than individuals 
may be far more willing to undertake sacrifices for a common ideal if 
there are effective assurances that others are making sacrifices too.”165  
The vast literature on norm formation and enforcement, through both 
informal and formal mechanisms, however, shows that pride of “place,” 
as much as abstract commitments to national ideals, can often drive 
positive environmental change.  That is not to say that Stewart got it 
wrong.  Instead, counterexamples simply demonstrate that shared 
commitments to pursue environmental objectives in the face of personal 
sacrifice are dependent on a host of variables such as context, effective 
leadership, and the particular issues to be addressed.  These variables 
may favor decentralized regulatory structures in some cases and more 
centralized structures in others. 
There is little disagreement, however, that Professor Stewart got it 
right when he argued that national regulation is warranted in the face of 
interstate “spillovers” or externalities.166  As Professors Adelman and 
Engel explain, the argument for federal regulation in the presence of 
interstate spillovers “begins with a simple insight: regulation would be 
inefficient if its costs and benefits were not fully internalized by the 
 
 162.  See Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 614-
15 (1996); see also Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution, supra note 48, at 145-50. 
 163.  See Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?, supra note 149, at 1213-15.  
 164.  Id. at 1214-15. 
 165.  Id. at 1217.  
 166.  Id. 
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regulating authority.”167  The apparent agreement on principle has, 
however, spawned robust debate on application. 
The idea that jurisdictional authority should align geographically 
with the scope of environmental problems has become known as the 
“Matching Principle.”168  This principle, coined by Professors Butler and 
Macey, can be stated simply: “the size of the geographic area affected by 
a specific pollution source should determine the appropriate 
governmental level for responding to the pollution.  There is no need for 
the regulating jurisdiction to be larger than the regulated activity.”169  
Where federal regulation addresses activities that have only local effects, 
there is a “jurisdictional mismatch.”170  Most of the advocates of the 
mismatch theory invoke federalism principles as a basis for favoring 
state over national regulatory authority for most environmental 
problems.171 
More recent environmental federalism scholarship has extolled the 
virtues of cooperative federalism and its opportunities for overlapping 
regulatory authority, noting that it can foster greater possibilities for 
“dynamic” or “adaptive” regulatory systems, in which allocations of 
authority are more fluid and responsive to larger contextual 
circumstances.172  As Professor Buzbee puts it: “Not only are state and 
federal interactions dynamic at any point in time, with regulators 
interacting in myriad ways, but they each will change in response to the 
actions of the other, to changing environmental circumstances and, 
especially, to the ever-changing political climate.”173  This dynamism 
can lead to important innovations that may bubble up from the bottom 
rather than trickle down from the top.174  Others have advocated for 
“multi-scalar”175 or “modal”176 institutional arrangements in which 
federal and state power is exercised at different levels or scales and/or in 
a variety of collaborative forms. 
 
 167.  Adelman & Engel, Adaptive Federalism, supra note 149, at 1803. 
 168.  Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The 
Case for Reallocating Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 25 (1996). 
 169.  Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The 
Case for Reallocating Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 25 (1996).  
 170.  Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch, supra note 150,, at 130. 
 171.  See id. at 132; see also Butler & Macey, supra note 169, at  27-28.  
 172.  William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108, 
112 (2005). 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  See, e.g., Hari M. Ososfksy, Is Climate Change “International”? Litigation’s Diagonal 
Regulatory Role, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 585 (2009). 
 176.  See Freeman & Farber, supra note 5.   
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The “matching principle” scholarship and “dynamic” or “adaptive” 
federalism scholarship share a basic commitment to federalism as an 
organizing principle.  Yet, aside from some basic constitutional and 
historical arrangements, it is not at all apparent why federalism should 
be either the starting or ending point for discussions of appropriate 
institutional arrangements.  Indeed, arguments for a greater state or 
national presence in particular areas of environmental management, or in 
environmental law generally, tend to posed within an artificially 
constrained set of institutional choices.  The federalism debate is poised 
in a landscape of false choices: nationally uniform regulation or diverse 
state-centered regulation, or some mixture of the two. 
The false choices posed by federalism-dominated discussions of 
appropriate institutional arrangements are based on the failure to 
recognize a distinction between decentralized regulatory authority and 
federalism. 177  Concerns about “jurisdictional mismatch” or institutional 
scale are not really so much about federalism, but instead are arguments 
about the appropriate degree of centralization of regulatory functions.  
However, “decentralization” may be understood more simply as “a 
managerial concept; it refers to the delegation of centralized authority to 
subordinate units of either a geographic or functional character. . . .”178  
The appropriate degree of decentralization is not, or not necessarily, a 
question about respecting constitutional allocations of authority, but 
instead a question about how to “achieve effective management.”179  
Decentralization may promote effective management because a 
subordinate agent, “who is relatively close to the subject matter will be 
more knowledgeable, more responsive, and more involved than a higher 
ranking person ensconced in some distant central office.”180 
The traditional idea of federalism, by contrast, is not in principle 
about managerial choice concerning the most effective way to achieve 
particular policy goals; rather, federalism is about the constitutional 
scope of managerial authority, or put in different terms, about the scope 
of the states’ rights of “exit” (i.e., the right of states to resist federal 
policy choices and put in place policies more to their own liking).181  On 
 
 177.  See Cross, The Folly of Federalism, supra note 161, at 18 (“The most serious flaw in 
federalism scholarship . . . is the false conflation of federalism with decentralization.”); see also 
Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. 
REV. 903, 910 (1994) (noting a need to “distinguish federalism from decentralization”). 
 178.  Rubin & Feely, supra note 178, at 910. 
 179.  Id.  See also ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO THE 
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). 
 180.  Rubin & Feeley, supra note 177, at 910. 
 181.  See Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court 2009 Term – Foreword: Federalism All the 
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this view, the instrumental benefits of the decentralization that 
federalism provides, while welcome, are largely beside the point; when 
acting within its protected sphere of autonomy, a state may make even 
atrociously bad policy judgments—however defined—without fear of 
federal interference.  A federalism-based system of environmental 
regulation would, accordingly, involve judgments not about the 
appropriate degree of centralization, such as those advanced under the 
“jurisdictional mismatch” thesis.  Nor would it involve discussion about 
the myriad ways in which states could contribute to overall program 
effectiveness, such as those found in the “adaptive” or “dynamic” 
federalism literature.  Less still would it concern itself with various sorts 
of collective action problems that may hamper the voices of diverse and 
important constituencies or stakeholders.  Instead, it would involve 
discussion about the points of exit that the states, by virtue of their 
constitutional status, enjoy—the points at which the states “may make 
policy in accord with their own preferences, separate and apart from the 
center,” or national authority.182 
I do not mean to suggest that the predominate forms of a weaker 
notion of “federalism” —ones that endorse “institutional arrangements 
[that] promote voice, not exit; integration, not autonomy; 
interdependence, not independence”183—should be abandoned or 
ignored.  To the contrary, to the extent that this kind of “federalism” 
promotes values associated with decentralization, they should serve as 
appropriate points of discussion about overall institutional arrangements 
for environmental management.  For example, regardless of the degree 
to which national authority is decentralized, it may still be worthwhile to 
provide opportunities for states to regulate environmental conditions 
concurrently with the national government by limiting the circumstances 
in which federal law will be deemed to preempt state law.184  By the 
same token, one should not let the “ghost of sovereignty” that pervades 
and often informs these weaker versions of federalism stand in the way 
of securing the values that other forms of decentralization may better 
 
Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 12 (2010) (describing traditional views of federalism as based on 
sovereignty “which formally guarantees a state’s power to rule without interference over a 
policymaking domain of its own”) [hereinafter, Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down]; see also 
Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, supra note 45, at 1258 (describing views of 
federalism). 
 182.  Id. at 7.  
 183.  Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 181, at 7. 
 184.  See Adelman & Engel, Adaptive Federalism, supra note 149, at 1832-49 (arguing that 
presumptions against preemption will promote dynamic and adaptive forms of environmental 
regulation). 
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promote.185  It is also important not to let the presumptive 
decentralization that federalism by definition promotes cloud our 
thinking about the kind of decentralization that will promote effective 
environmental management. 
Viewed from this perspective, the cooperative federalism model 
that has been so heavily relied upon by Congress in the design of our 
major environmental programs, such as the CAA and CWA, should be 
assessed not in terms of federalism principles, but instead as a 
managerial decision about the appropriate degree of centralization and 
decentralization in our environmental programs.  After all, it is doubtful 
that the degree to which federalism infects current environmental law is 
constitutionally compelled.  In the case of the CAA and CWA, in 
particular, nearly all the elements of these statutory programs may be 
implemented directly by the federal government should the states fail to 
act.  As such, these programs should be open to criticism for their 
failures to advance the very values that pivot around assessments of 
overall program design—values such as effectiveness and efficiency in 
achieving overall program objectives, overcoming collective action 
problems that may stymie robust participation in program 
implementation by affected stakeholders, and overall responsiveness to 
public preferences.  In my view, the shortcomings in our current 
environmental programs along these vectors argue powerfully for 
thinking about alternative institutional arrangements—ones that give 
appropriate consideration to federalism values but are not slavishly 
yoked to those values. 
From a managerial perspective, there is no reason to believe that the 
federalism-based form of decentralization that shapes our environmental 
laws enhances the overall effectiveness of those laws.  The scope of 
environmental problems rarely, if ever, coincides neatly with the 
otherwise arbitrary lines on the map that demarcate the jurisdictional 
limits of state authority.  Nor is there any reason to believe that the 
variable local conditions that might support variation in overall program 
policies and priorities can be mapped along state jurisdictional 
boundaries.186  In fact, the intra-national variation experienced in our 
current, federalism-based approach seems to be more the product of the 
respective states’ inclination to favor economic investment over 
environmental protection; variation in local environmental conditions 
 
 185.  See Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 181, at 11-33 (discussing how the 
“ghost of sovereignty” haunts thinking about federalism and institutional arrangements). 
 186.  See Karkkainen, supra note 3, at 216 (concluding that “the states are not ideally matched 
to the task [of ecosystem management] either territorially or in terms of institutional capacities”). 
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seems to have little or no influence on the extent or shape of this 
variation.187 
Stewart pragmatically understood that the federal government’s 
dependence on the states had severely compromised the effectiveness of 
our environmental laws.188  He pointedly argued that the problems 
associated with that dependence “could be alleviated if federal officials 
were empowered to require or induce local officials” to adhere more 
strictly to federal requirements.189 
Before more effective forms of decentralization can be imagined, 
one must first move beyond federalism-based forms of decentralization.  
One promising alternative that may overcome this federalism-based 
dependence, little explored in the scholarly literature, is to situate 
environmental management within semi-autonomous regional entities, 
rather than in states.  Of course, regional environmental management is 
not itself a new idea; there are numerous examples of it currently in 
place.190  For the most part, however, these institutions take the form of 
interstate compacts or advisory entities with little or no authority to 
make policy with binding legal effect and virtually no authority that 
extends beyond a particular environmental medium, such as a nationally 
significant body of water like Lake Tahoe191 or the Chesapeake Bay.192  
Similarly, the scale of these institutions is often based on a specific 
environmental target, such as water quality, and is not likely suitable for 
addressing multi-media environmental problems. 
What I am suggesting is fundamentally different.  I propose that 
federal regulatory authority be allocated to relatively autonomous 
regional institutions—call them “Regional Environmental Management 
Agencies” (“REMAs”), vested with regulatory authority roughly 
 
 187.  See Weiland & Vos, supra note 144, at 129 (noting that “when states make policy alone, 
they are generally more in tune with economic investment than with environmental protection”). 
 188.  Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?, supra note 149, at 1196. 
 189.  Id.  
 190.  For some prominent examples, see Jon Cannon, Choices and Institutions in Watershed 
Management, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 379 (2000) [hereinafter Cannon, Choices 
and Institutions in Watershed Management] (discussing the Chesapeake Bay Program, a 
collaborative, three-state regional program to improve water quality in the Chesapeake Bay); 
Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: A Regional Approach, 14 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 54 (2005) (discussing regional climate change programs, such as the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, which involves seven states in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic regions); 
Matthew McKinney et al., Regionalism in the West: An Inventory and Assessment, 23 PUB. LAND & 
RESOURCES L. REV. 101 (2002) (listing regional arrangements in the western United States).   
 191.  See Mark T. Imperial & Derek Kauneckis, Moving from Conflict to Collaboration: 
Watershed Governance in Lake Tahoe, 43 NAT. RES. J. 1009 (2003).  
 192.  See Cannon, Choices and Institutions in Watershed Management, supra note 191.   
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equivalent to, but in important ways more extensive than, the authority 
currently exercised by EPA.  This robust regional authority would, 
however, be limited in scope to, and appropriately tailored for, distinct 
sub-national geographic regions.193  These REMAs would be federal 
agencies vested with delegated national power, but constrained within 
sub-national, regionally-defined jurisdictional limits. 
The idea that national power may be divided and allocated among 
regionally-based agencies seems not to have entered conversations 
concerning “environmental federalism” in any significant way.194  To be 
sure, there have been discussions about “hybrid regional institutions,” 
that draw upon and utilize the pre-existing regulatory authority of the 
states and national government,195 but these institutions have been ad 
hoc and unstable, and therefore lack clear regulatory authority and 
program continuity.  Likewise, there are occasional references in the 
scholarly literature to the desirability of regional approaches to 
environmental management, but little in the way of actual proposals for 
regionally- based regulatory authority.196  I believe it is time to give 
regional governance a more concrete and stable institutional foundation.  
In the next section, I begin to sketch out the basic institutional 
arrangements underlying a regional approach to environmental 
management and why these arrangements may yield significant 
improvements in our ability to manage environmental problems in a 
responsive, effective, and efficient manner. 
III. TOWARD REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE. 
As described in Section I of this article, the current institutional 
arrangements under the CAA and CWA hamper effective environmental 
regulation in a number of ways, and do not yield productive policy 
variation that one may expect from an appropriately decentralized 
regulatory system.  In terms of the CAA, the SIP process no longer 
delivers in any significant way the benefits of decentralized regulatory 
 
 193.  The regional approach I endorse in this article bears a family resemblance to the “new 
regionalism” approaches that have been proposed to deal with problems associated with the 
fragmentation of  regulatory authority in major metropolitan areas, but operates at a larger 
geographic scale.  For a critical evaluation of the “new regionalism,” see Lisa T. Alexander, The 
Promise and Perils of “New Regionalist” Approaches to Sustainable Communities, 38 FORDHAM 
URBAN L.J. 629 (2011).  
 194.  For a notable exception, see Weiland & Vos, supra note 144. 
 195.  See, e.g, Karkkainen, supra note 3, at 217-22. 
 196.  See, e.g., Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution, supra note 48, at 141 
(recognizing desirability of “regional solutions, such as the creation of regional entities or interstate 
compact” to address certain kinds of interstate environmental problems).   
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decision-making that it originally promised.  By contrast, the division of 
regulatory authority between the national and state governments under 
the CWA has generated a large, indeed excessive, degree of 
decentralization, resulting in ineffective environmental management.  
The overall goals of the CWA have, in consequence, been severely 
compromised. 
A regional approach, by contrast, could be effectively tailored to 
reap the benefits of decentralized environmental management, while 
preserving the benefits of national authority.  My endorsement of 
REMAs is intended to explore these possibilities.  In what follows, I 
offer some preliminary architectural renderings of how REMAs may be 
structured, the scope of their responsibilities, and a general assessment 
of how they may increase the overall effectiveness of our environmental 
laws.  I will focus particularly on the CWA and the CAA, but offer some 
speculation about how the authority of REMAs might be expanded over 
time to promote a more holistic, integrated approach to environmental 
management that spans across other federal environmental laws. 
A. Demarcating Regional Boundaries: A Provisional Approach 
The regional approach I suggest here is not intended to be an 
exercise in applying any specific version of the Matching Principle.  
While the scale of many of our existing environmental problems may, 
from a geographic perspective, fit nicely within or coincide with 
regionally-based institutions, I agree with Professors Adelman and Engel 
that “[t]he matching principle fails because no systematic way exists to 
bound most environmental problems, and thus to ensure that all of the 
costs and benefits are internalized by the regulating entity.”197  
Nonetheless, any attempt to establish regionally-based institutions must 
cope with the problem of demarcating the “regions” within which the 
institutions are to operate.  The scope and character of environmental 
problems, while not determinative of jurisdictional boundaries, must be 
taken as a primary consideration. 
A starting point is the current structure of the Environmental 
Protection Agency, which includes regional components—namely 
EPA’s ten regional offices.198  The current configuration and 
geographical boundaries of these existing EPA regions may promote 
suitable variation in environmental policy, but the present configuration 
 
 197.  See Adelman & Engel, Adaptive Federalism, supra note 149, at 1817. 
 198.  See About EPA, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/index.html (last 
visited May 5, 2013). 
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could be fine-tuned to better reflect the nature and scope of extant 
environmental issues and the diversity of preferences among affected 
communities. 
Paul Weiland and Robert Vos have usefully suggested that EPA’s 
regional offices be organized along “eco-regions,” which they describe 
as “blend[ing] a respect for natural features of the land with an 
understanding of how humans already live with natural systems in terms 
of economic production and cultural identification.”199  One of the basic 
commitments of this approach to locating jurisdictional boundaries, 
which I share, is that it promises a greater connection between regulatory 
institutions and the “places that people relate to.”200  In this way, 
institutional arrangements can better reflect shared cultural and historical 
values, as well as common lived experience with particular 
environmental problems.  Of course, any effort to draw jurisdictional 
lines on a map will involve large amounts of guess-work, even 
arbitrariness.  I do believe, however, that any problems with the initial 
drawing of boundaries may be mitigated by adjustments over time, 
through broadly participatory processes. 
B. The Scope of Regional Authority: Limiting Reach While Expanding 
the RegulatoryToolkit 
Drawing again upon the existing structure of EPA, it is important to 
recognize that EPA’s regional offices already enjoy some limited 
measure of autonomy and are likely to be more knowledgeable of local 
conditions and the ways in which existing approaches to environmental 
problems are succeeding and failing in their respective regions.  For 
example, under the CAA, EPA’s regional offices are responsible for 
reviewing and negotiating the terms of SIPs in the first instance, subject 
to ultimate approval by EPA headquarters.201  In addition, these regional 
offices review permits issued by approved state programs under the 
CAA and CWA, and in the absence of approved state programs, issue 
such permits themselves.202  They are in frequent and repeated contact 
with major stakeholders and state agency personnel within their regions.  
Through these responsibilities, the regional offices have much greater 
knowledge of local cultural and environmental conditions than does 
EPA headquarters. 
 
 199.  Weiland & Vos, supra note 144, at 116. 
 200.  Id.  
 201.  See 40 C.F.R. § 51.103 (2007).  
 202.  See 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.21-37. 
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To capitalize on this knowledge and experience, we should 
refashion our major environmental programs to devolve greater authority 
on these sub-national regional agencies, rebranding them as REMAs.  
Each REMA would be headed by presidentially-appointed administrator.  
Importantly, each REMA would have independent budget lines and the 
attendant discretion to allocate funding according to the REMA’s basic 
program and policy priorities.  This is not to suggest that EPA should be 
abolished.  Many of the current functions performed centrally by the 
agency should be retained.  In the context of CAA, for example, EPA 
would continue to be responsible for regulating most mobile sources, 
such as new motor vehicles, through nationally uniform emissions 
limitations, with suitable allowance for state variation under the 
California waiver process.203  It would also be responsible for 
responding to inter-regional spillovers, such as air pollution transport.  
More generally, EPA would continue to fund and support basic and 
applied scientific and technology research, maintain and augment 
existing information clearinghouses, and to develop and support 
innovative policy tools. 
In terms of more specific program responsibilities under the CAA, I 
will here only highlight some of the more important institutional 
reforms.  First, REMAs should be given authority to promulgate 
regional ambient air quality standards to replace the existing NAAQS, 
subject to a regulatory “floor.”  The floor would be the more stringent of 
either the existing NAAQS or existing air quality.  These floors would 
form a public health or anti-degradation baseline for new regional air 
quality standards.  For some regions, however, the existing NAAQS 
should be a “soft” floor.  Following the CWA’s approach to the 
“fishable/swimmable” floor for state water quality standards, REMAs 
should be given limited authority to promulgate time-limited, below-the- 
floor regional standards in those circumstances in which attainment of 
the existing NAAQS is economically infeasible within a specified period 
of years.  This approach would displace the existing program that relies 
on extensions of attainment dates to accommodate the most severe and 
intractable air quality problems experienced in some nonattainment 
areas.  The more tailored and decentralized regional ambient air quality 
standards would also allow for the retirement of some existing CAA 
programs that seek to prevent significant deterioration in air quality in 
those areas that have attained the existing NAAQS. 
 
 203.  See Transportation and Air Quality: California Waivers and Authorizations, ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY www.epa.gov/omswww/cafr.htm (last visited May 5, 2013). 
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REMAs would also be given primary responsibilities that EPA 
currently does not possess.  Most importantly, REMAs would be 
charged with developing regional implementation plans (“RIPs”) to 
attain the regional ambient air quality standards.  The existing, and 
highly dysfunctional, SIP development and approval process would be 
scrapped in its entirety, though, of course, existing SIP elements could 
provisionally be incorporated in the RIPs, as appropriate, to provide for 
a smoother transition of regulatory authority.  RIPs would be developed 
through a broadly participatory rulemaking process in which interested 
local and state jurisdictions and private stakeholders would be consulted.  
The regional scope of the planning effort may make greater use of such 
policy innovations as emissions trading programs more practical and 
effective, permitting more cost-effective reductions in emissions from 
larger stationary sources of the more common, “criteria” pollutants and 
their precursors.  Existing state operating permit programs would be 
retained, subject to continuing oversight by the REMAs.  REMAs would 
also be responsible for updating existing federal emissions limitations on 
new and existing stationary sources. 
As with the proposed reforms to the CAA, many of the 
responsibilities of EPA and the states under the existing CWA would be 
shifted to the REMAs.  Existing state permitting programs (“SPDES”) 
would be retained, but would be funded by permit fees like the current 
Title V permitting program under the CAA.204  As with the CAA 
proposal, REMAs would gain authority that EPA currently does not 
enjoy.  REMAs, not states, would be responsible for promulgating water 
quality standards and water management plans, many of which would 
incorporate existing state water quality standards, with revisions as 
deemed appropriate by the respective REMAs.  In addition, REMAs 
would be responsible for promulgating regional total maximum daily 
loads (“TMDLS”) for impaired water segments that do not currently 
meet the applicable water quality standards.  These TMDLs would 
include federally enforceable load allocations to non-point sources of 
pollution, based primarily on reductions achievable through best 
management practices.  Again, the regional scope of REMAs’ authority 
may make watershed approaches to water quality management more 
practical and effective.  Such watershed approaches may also promote 
greater innovation, such as more effective use of effluent trading 
 
 204.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(3) (1990) (requiring that state permit programs charge fees 
“sufficient to cover all reasonable (direct and indirect) costs required to develop and administer the 
permit program requirements of this subchapter”).   
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programs in which non-point and point sources could participate.  More 
generally, REMAs would be given authority to impose direct restrictions 
on non-point sources of water pollutants, requiring best management 
practices and implemented through individual and general permits, 
modeled loosely along the lines of the current Section 404 permit 
program governing discharges of dredged and fill material into wetlands 
and other environmentally sensitive aquatic environments.  This would 
finally put in place limited federal authority for monitoring and 
regulating land uses that are impairing the nation’s water resources, 
replacing the uncoordinated and ineffective control of such uses 
currently vested in the states.  There is little doubt that an appropriately 
limited program governing such land use practices could survive 
constitutional scrutiny, as precedent under the Section 404 permitting 
program demonstrates.205 
C. The Benefits of Regional Environmental Government: A Summary 
Speculative Evaluation 
The rough sketch of the scope and authority of REMAs provided 
above is intended only to address some of the most problematic program 
elements of the existing CAA and CWA regulatory programs.  Yet, once 
established, REMAs could serve as basic institutional building blocks 
for more lasting and important reforms of our existing environmental 
laws.  The most fundamental change is to decouple the obvious need for 
decentralized environmental management from the federalism-infused 
approach embraced by our current institutional structure.  In this way, 
we can distance ourselves from a system that uses state political 
boundaries as presumptively appropriate measures of decentralization 
and move toward more environmentally relevant criteria, such as air 
sheds and watersheds and the varieties of ways in which ecosystems and 
citizens interact. 
The decentralization provided by the establishment of REMAs 
should deliver many of the benefits typically associated with federalism, 
 
 205.  While the Court’s decisions in Solid Waste Agency v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 
U.S. 159 (2001) and Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) might preclude the extension of 
land use controls to protect water quality in remote and isolated waters, neither decision casts 
constitutional doubt on Congress’s authority to control land use practices that adversely affect 
“navigable waters.”  However, the scope of that term might ultimately be defined.  I do not mean to 
suggest that the limitations imposed by Solid Waste Agency and Rapanos do not make effective 
federal watershed management more difficult; they undoubtedly do.  Nonetheless, the kind of land 
use practices that may be reached by expanded federal regulatory authority will clearly make an 
appreciable difference in watershed management.   
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but which our current federalism-based approach has failed to deliver.  
For starters, the establishment of semi-autonomous REMAs will bring to 
our environmental law a greater sensitivity to regional variations in 
environmental conditions and preferences for environmental quality.  
REMAs can be expected to be responsive to regional preferences to a 
much greater extent than is currently possible for EPA and the states, 
respectively.  This will permit scarce regulatory resources to be allocated 
in ways to meet the environmental challenges deemed to be of the 
highest priority within the respective regions. 
Moreover, reallocating power to REMAs and away from the states 
and EPA may tend to give local communities, such as cities and other 
political subdivisions, a much more muscular  voice in the shape of 
environmental programs.  Freed from the necessity to rely excessively 
on the states to implement federal standards, REMAs may be able to 
forge greater working relations with cities, counties, and special purpose 
agencies and districts.206  When local governmental units are given a 
voice separate and apart from the voice of the “state” in the shape and 
content of national environmental programs, one may expect the national 
authority to be more responsive to those local concerns.  Concretely, 
REMAs may be able to target grants and program resources more 
directly to the local governmental units that need them than is currently 
practical under our cooperative federalism model. 
REMAs may also serve as laboratories in which innovative and 
creative policies can be tested on a provisional and more limited basis 
than is currently practicable under existing institutional arrangements.  
No doubt, some of these policy innovations may fail, but some may 
succeed, yielding transferable knowledge and experience upon which 
other REMAs may build. 
REMAs can also be expected to be much more nimble, flexible and 
adaptive to changing conditions than our existing system, which yokes 
together a central national agency and the states in an often 
uncomfortable, if not conflictual, relationship that makes effective 
coordination costly and difficult.  States have resisted many of EPA’s 
efforts to adapt our current programs to meet persistent environmental 
problems, making change difficult, and in some cases, legally 
 
 206.  As Frank Cross has argued, “State governments do not form the sort of integrated 
communities appropriate to uniform policymaking.  Given the ‘size of state government’ it is 
‘difficult to credit the traditional belief that local self-determination could genuinely be achieved by 
state autonomy.’” Cross, The Folly of Federalism, supra note 160, at 21 (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, 
Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 425 (1987)).   
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impossible.207  By giving REMAs primary authority for developing 
regional implementation plans for air and water quality standards, this 
friction can be eliminated, allowing for more responsive and effective 
adaptations.  This responsiveness and adaptability will likely grow in 
importance as the effects of global climate change become more visible 
and pronounced.  Likewise, the disruptive effect of litigation may be 
limited under a national environmental management system of linked, 
but semi-autonomous REMAs because an adverse judicial decision 
against one REMA’s actions will not be applicable to, or binding on, 
other REMAs.208  As a consequence, the environmental program as a 
whole will be much more resilient than the existing institutional 
arrangements. 
REMAs may also enhance local participation in the development of 
environmental regulation.  Under the current institutional arrangements, 
EPA rulemaking processes are dominated by a relatively small number 
of repeat players, many of which lack knowledge of or sensitivity to 
more local environmental conditions.209  National rulemakings are often 
so broad in scope that local interests and stakeholders may find it 
difficult to assess how particular regulatory proposals may affect them, 
raising the costs of and creating disincentives for active participation.  In 
a regionally-based rulemaking, by contrast, the local effects of 
regulatory proposals should be more salient, creating greater 
opportunities for effective organizing among citizens and greater 
incentives for participation.210  Moreover, regionally-based rulemaking 
proceedings are much more likely than national rulemakings to attract 
environmental advocacy groups that are formed to protect particular 
 
 207.  See, e.,g., Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that EPA may not 
require states in ozone transport region to revise their SIPs to include a “California” vehicle 
emissions program).   
 208.  Promoting better legal decisions by the courts is an additional benefit of a regionally-
based environmental management system.  The current system relies extensively on the Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as the court of choice for reviewing nationally applicable regulations 
promulgated by EPA under the CAA and CWA.  The CAA in particular makes the D.C. Circuit the 
exclusive forum for review of “nationally applicable regulations promulgated, or final actions taken, 
by” EPA.  42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(1) (1990).  Review of decisions by REMAs could be lodged in the 
court of appeals for the circuit that most closely aligns with the jurisdictional limits of the REMA.  
By creating a greater diversity of reviewing courts, the REMA-based program may promote 
differing views on recurring legal issues, enhancing the prospects of more carefully reasoned and 
thoroughly considered legal doctrine.  Thanks to Sam Jordan for this suggestion.   
 209.  McGarity & Thomas, Some Thoughts on Deossifying the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE 
L.J. 1385 (1991-1992). 
 210.  See Weiland & Vos, supra note 144, at 122-23 (arguing that under regional management 
approaches citizen “participation might be amplified”).   
42
Akron Law Review, Vol. 46 [2013], Iss. 4, Art. 9
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss4/9
VOL. 46, NO. 4 - ARTICLE 8 WILLIAMS (DO NOT DELETE) 9/19/2013  2:51 PM 
2013] TOWARD REGIONAL GOVERNANCE 1089 
resources or address particular regional environmental problems.211 
More generally, REMAs may be capable of fostering cooperative 
arrangements with local and state agencies and private stakeholders to a 
much greater extent than is possible under current institutional 
arrangements.  Being in more consistent contact with such stakeholders 
than is practicable under current arrangements, REMAs would be more 
likely to gather meaningful information about particular environmental 
problems and monitor the effectiveness of the responses that are made to 
them.  This may foster a form of adaptive management in which 
environmental improvement is made through an iterative process of trial, 
monitoring, and response.  The closer working relationships that 
REMAs may be able to foster with local stakeholders may also result 
from the added leverage provided by the REMAs’ primary role in 
developing enforceable implementation plan components for both air 
and water resources.  Through this leverage, REMAs may induce 
otherwise reluctant stakeholders to participate in cooperative ventures to 
improve environmental quality.  A useful analogy of how such leverage 
can yield policy innovations is the Fish and Wildlife Service’s 
invocation of the take prohabition in the Endangered Species Act 
(“ESA”) to fashion collaborative, large-scale habitat conservation 
planning under the ESA’s incidental take permit program.212 
Over time, REMAs can also be expected to provide greater 
opportunities to integrate various programs in ways that more effectively 
address cross-media effects of various activities.213  By directing 
regulatory resources to regional, rather than national problems, it is 
likely that REMAs will be able to monitor cross-media effects more 
closely and to respond to them more effectively.  In the longer term, one 
may expect REMAs to play an increasingly important role in larger scale 
infrastructure planning and implementation, including the sitting of 
energy-producing facilities, transportation networks, and water 
development projects.  The result may be a more holistic approach to 
environmental management and a more sustainable and resilient network 
of “eco-regions.”214 
 
 211.  See Jonathan Cannon, Checking In on the Chesapeake: Some Questions of Design, 40 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 1131, 1142-45 (2006) (discussing how more locally-based advocacy groups may be 
more likely to participate in regional management programs than national rulemakings).  
 212.  See J.B. Ruhl, Who Needs Congress? An Agenda for Administrative Reform of the 
Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 367 (1998).   
 213.  See Weiland & Vos, supra note 144, at 118.  
 214.  See id. at 118-119. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Our existing environmental laws rely extensively on a model of 
cooperative federalism in which authority is divided among the national 
and state governments.  This approach to environmental management is 
becoming strained and ineffective.  The promised benefits of this form 
of decentralized policymaking have not been realized, yet it is clear that 
some degree of decentralization is necessary to ensure a sustainable, 
adaptable and resilient regulatory system that effectively responds to 
persistent and changing environmental problems.  Decentralizing 
national power along regional lines may provide a way to secure these 
important objectives.  Regional Environmental Management Agencies, 
properly scaled and vested with appropriate regulatory authority, are a 
promising alternative to our now outdated, 1970s-vintage regulatory 
programs. 
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